Remarks on Advocacy Before the United States Court of International Trade by Restani, Jane A.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 10, Issue 2 1986 Article 1
Remarks on Advocacy Before the United
States Court of International Trade
Jane A. Restani∗
∗
Copyright c©1986 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Remarks on Advocacy Before the United
States Court of International Trade
Jane A. Restani
Abstract
There seems to be a prevailing assumption that advocacy before the United States Court of
International Trade (CIT or the court) somehow differs from advocacy in general. I suggest that
to a large degree it does not. Despite the similarities to practice in other courts, there are a few
matters worth noting about practice in a court that is designed to interpret a few statutes in a
uniform manner, especially statutes that are intended to be comprehensive. Now that I have stated
the general rules, I would like to mention a few somewhat more philosophical considerations and
exceptions.
REMARKS ON ADVOCACY BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The Honorable Jane A. Restani*
There seems to be a prevailing assumption that advocacy
before the United States Court of International Trade' (CIT or
the court) somehow differs from advocacy in general. I sug-
gest that to a large degree it does not. The issues that arise
before the court involve the full range of legal issues present in
the civil arena.2 The court faces a variety of the usual federal
jurisdictional, standing, and sovereign immunity problems, as
well as problems of statutory construction and application of
seemingly conflicting precedents. The issues relate to admin-
istrative law, constitutional law, contracts, equity, and torts, as
well as to substantive international trade law. Furthermore,
"international trade law" is a hodgepodge of classification and
valuation questions under the tariff laws; other laws regulating,
restricting, or prohibiting importations and the import pro-
cess; and, of course, laws relating to remedies for "unfair trade
* Judge, United States Court of International Trade. These remarks were
presented in large part as a speech to members of the Litigation Section of the Amer-
ican Bar Association in New York City, on August 12, 1986.
1. The United States Customs Court was transformed into the United States
Court of International Trade [hereinafter CIT or the court] by the Customs Court
Act of 1980 (CCA), 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1982), to "create a comprehensive system of
judicial review of civil actions arising from import transactions." S. REP. No. 466,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3729.
Under the CCA, the CIT was given expanded jurisdiction and the full powers of a
United States District Court in order both to clarify the confusion concerning juris-
diction over international trade matters and to implement the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2501, et seq. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER, Reference
File, (BNA) 98:0101 (Sept. 17, 1986).
The CIT consists of nine Presidentially appointed judges, 28 U.S.C. § 251(a),
and is located in New York, New York. Id. § 251(c). The chiefjudge, however, may
designate a judge or judges to preside at a trial or hearing at any port or place within
the jurisdiction of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 256(a). Appeals from the CIT are
heard in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982, 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-49 (1982). For more detailed information, see Amer-
ine, Jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade, One Year After the Customs Court Act of
1980, 29 FED. B. NEWS &J. 43 (1982).
2. The court also manages to tread in the realm of criminal law or procedure
occasionally. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 10 CIT -, 634 F. Supp. 409 (1986).
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practices.'
Despite the similarities to practice in other courts, there
are a few matters worth noting about practice in a court that is
designed to interpret a few statutes in a uniform manner, espe-
cially statutes that are intended to be comprehensive.
Although there is a good deal of trial practice, and even jury
trial practice, before the court, most of the work of the court
involves motion practice. Therefore, I will direct my remarks
largely to the presentation of briefs and oral argument. Ac-
cordingly, most, but not all, of my comments relate to "unfair
trade practice litigation."
The general points of good advocacy have often been
stated:
(1) Do not read your argument.
(2) Answer questions from the bench directly.
(3) Let the judge talk. You may learn how to make your
argument in a winning way.
(4) If the judge wants to engage in a debate to test a the-
ory, cooperate, be polite, but do not concede important
points.
(5) Do not try a shotgun approach at oral argument. Pre-
serve your arguments in the brief, but do not burden the
court or yourself with minor points during a short argu-
ment.
4
Now that I have stated the general rules, I would like to men-
tion a few somewhat more philosophical considerations and
exceptions.
First, there is a problem in taking the shotgun approach to
unfair trade cases, even in a brief. There is no such thing as a
perfect agency record (or trial court record, for that matter),
and no court will reverse the deciding agency ' for a few harm-
less or minor errors in making factual determinations. There-
3. The unfair trade practices at issue before the court are sale of goods at less
than fair value and governmental subsidization of exports. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-
167 7(g) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (the antidumping and countervailing duty laws).
4. A recent article along these lines is Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy, 22 S. TEX. L.
REV. 289 (1986). For a more complete treatment, see E. RE, BRIEF WRITING AND
ORAL ARGUMENT (5th ed. 1983).
5. The agencies involved in unfair trade cases are the International Trade Ad-
ministration of the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commis-
sion. In cases other than those dealing with unfair trade, the United States Customs
Service or the United States Department of Labor often appear before the court.
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fore, do not list every sin. If plaintiff's counsel does not recog-
nize any failure of an agency to follow the law, he or she should
focus on arguments that undermine the basis of the agency's
factual findings. You should note that the CIT and the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have both made it clear that
they will not upset an agency's factual determination just be-
cause they disagree with the determination. 6 To reverse it, the
court must find the agency's decision unreasonable or, as the
statute says, that the determination was "unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence." 7 On the other hand, agency lawyers and
other attorneys supporting the determination at issue must be
ready to examine the facts in detail. Reliance on general asser-
tions of the legal burdens placed on the plaintiff will not carry
the day.
Second, it is my opinion that no legal issue is decided
without involving other legal issues, both foreseeable and un-
foreseeable. To the extent that one can frame the issue in a
case to minimize its external impact, the easier it will be to
make the relevant arguments, to predict the outcome of the
court's decision, and, probably, to make a more appealing ar-
gument. Unlike Henry Friendly,' and to use myself as an ex-
ample, not all judges can instantly relate all areas of the law to
the problem at hand. Therefore, I must go through a step-by-
step process to determine if the solution proposed by a party
makes sense in the context of the whole body of law. Many
times I arrive at the conclusion that it does not. The next step
for me is to redefine the problem in its narrowest form. (One
might think that this should be the first step, but I find this
difficult to do until I understand the whole network of legal
relationships.) After arriving at a series of narrow and man-
ageable issues, I find that even complex cases can be decided
with a minimum of frustration.
6. See, e.g., American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843 n. II (1984)); Asahi Chem. Indus. Co. v. United States, 4 CIT 120, 123, 548 F.
Supp. 1261, 1264 (1982) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443,
450 (1978)).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1982). The court hears some cases de novo,
most notably in the tariff classification/valuation and fraud areas. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2640 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e)(1) (1982).
8. See Leval, Judge Henry Friendly-A Clerk's Fond Recollection, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18,
1986, at 1, col. 1.
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In this regard, I recommend you frame your issue nar-
rowly. I believe that judges usually wish to decide only the
case immediately before the court. Of course, everyone enjoys
expounding on the law occasionally, and sometimes it is neces-
sary. But on a day-to-day basis I believe most judges, espe-
cially those faced with highly complex issues such as problems
of construction of the international trade laws, do not want to
write opinions that affect situations they cannot possibly envi-
sion. Because there is so little precedent in the area, many de-
cisions of this court seem to have an importance beyond the
case at issue. However, as more cases arise and later decisions
clarify the law, it will become obvious that relatively few cases
decide a great deal beyond their facts.
Third, thoroughly test each theory. Wonderful argu-
ments, composed of complex, intriguing, and beautifully con-
structed theories, have been presented to the court. Unfortu-
nately, if the argument collapses like a house of cards after a
few "what ifs", it is not of much use. 9 Think about that one
horrible case; either the court or your opponent will. Occa-
sionally, the court arrives at a theory all its own, no doubt to
the chagrin of the advocates. My practice, in this regard, is to
explore it in oral argument. If the parties are baffled, possibly
because the theory is defective, or if the parties are anxious to
discuss the idea more fully, I allow supplemental briefing.
Fourth, be flexible. In chambers, I change my mind fre-
quently, sometimes coming full circle, and I am often swayed
at oral argument. Inasmuch as the court attempts to be flexi-
ble, your should be also. Of course, I do not mean that you
should support your opponent's position, but avoid rigidity. If
the court can not see it exactly your way, try an alternate ap-
proach. Presumably, the court wants to have an intelligent dis-
cussion about the case in general, and about each point in par-
ticular. That will not work if the advocate sticks to a script and
does not react to the colloquy as it develops.
Fifth, do not lose sight of the big picture. You want to win
the case for your client. If procedural disputes over jurisdic-
tional issues can be avoided by having your client take a certain
9. To explain many unfair trade issues thoroughly, it is helpful to use numerical
hypotheticals. See, e.g., Zenith Elec. Corp. v. United States, 10 CIT -, 633 F. Supp.
1382 n.9, 1386 n.10, 1387 n.ll (1986).
1986-1987]
action, do it. As we all know, the Customs Court Act of 1980
was intended to eliminate a great many jurisdictional dis-
putes.' O I sometimes wonder if the endless debate over juris-
diction could possibly have been more troublesome before
1980, because it certainly seems extremely troublesome now.
Sixth, the court is concerned with statutory language that
is at times confusing, if not ambiguous. Discussion of the the-
ory or policy behind a law aids understanding. Counsel should
concentrate, therefore, on how the provision fits into the stat-
ute as a whole and how his or her interpretation either furthers
the policies or aids in the efficient implementation of the act."
In some cases, explanation of how the statute meshes with in-
ternational agreements is also relevant.' 2
Seventh, do not avoid citing adverse cases that are difficult
to distinguish. If they are relevant, your opponent or the court
likely will find them. It is far better to consider carefully the
cases favoring your opponent's position and address them up
front in the briefs than to waffle or evade questions about such
cases at oral argument. In this regard, cite relevant adminis-
trative cases. Administratice practice can be reversed, but it
cannot be ignored. Credibility is an enormously important as-
set. Do not burden the court with untenable arguments. Lack
of credibility will haunt you in your next court appearance. Be
absolutely accurate or admit ignorance. In this regard, do not
be creative with the administrative record. Cite to the specific
support in the record for your point. If it is not there, do not
discuss it. You can usually make your "real world" points by
discussing policy, but do not pretend facts are in the record if
they are not.
All advocates have a responsibility to the court to present
their arguments in a factually and intellectually honest manner.
Sometimes you may wonder why a case seems to have been
10. H.R. Rep. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-48, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3729, 3755-60.
11. Counsel should not argue general trade policy concerns, such as the balance
of trade between the United States and another country, or the possible adverse ef-
fects on U.S. exports, because such considerations are not part of the standards ac-
cording to which the court must assess the decisions to be reviewed.
12. For example, the unfair trade laws were promulgated generally to meet our
obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT). S. REP. No.
249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 381,
387.
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decided so wrongly. Occasionally the judge was simply wrong,
but other times the advocacy leads to no other result. The
advocacy system requires effective counsel. In the area of in-
ternational trade, there are still many issues of first impression,
and we can foresee further statutory changes that will create
new issues. If you do not want cases decided wrongly coming
back to burden you, first make sure the court knows of the de-
fects in your opponent's argument. Second, take time to find
the best way of approaching your client's case so that your ar-
gument will help the law develop properly in this area.
